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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-2698
___________
THOMAS ROBINSON; WILLIAM HULL,
Appellants
WILLIAM HULL,
Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk Order dated 12/03/20
v.
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
SECRETARY JOHN E. WETZEL; SMART COMMUNICATION,
sued in their Private and Official Capacities
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-19-cv-01689)
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 11, 2021
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 19, 2021)
_________
OPINION*
_________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM
Thomas Robinson1 appeals from the order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss and
dismissing his case. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Robinson is a Pennsylvania inmate housed at the State Correctional InstitutionPhoenix. In April 2019, he filed his federal complaint against the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Corrections Secretary John Wetzel, and Smart
Communications, a contractor partnered with the DOC to implement changes to how
prison mail is processed. Under the mail policy, incoming inmate mail is sent to the
Smart Communications facility, where it is scanned and converted into digital
documents. Those digital documents are emailed to the prison, where they are printed
and given to the inmates. Robinson alleged that the policy allowed for interception,
inspection, storage, or destruction of the mail; and that the policy was implemented
regardless of content. He also alleged that only incoming court mail was treated as
privileged, and that attorney-client mail was being handled in a manner that violated
attorney-client confidentiality. Robinson challenged the mail policy pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1982, § 1983, § 1985, and § 1986. He also alleged that prison
officials retaliated against him by subjecting him to false misconduct charges for filing
his lawsuit, that the search and seizure of mail violated his rights under the Fourth

1

William Hull was a co-plaintiff and co-appellant. On December 3, 2020, the Clerk
dismissed Hull’s appeal for failure to timely prosecute. For simplicity, we refer to
Robinson as the sole plaintiff and appellant.
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Amendment, and that the constitutional violations constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment and equal protection violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
On May 13, 2019, the District Court granted Robinson’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and screened the complaint for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The District Court found no plausible suggestion that
§§ 1981, 1982, 1985, or 1986 were implicated in the complaint and dismissed those
claims;2 the District Court similarly found no allegations on which to base cruel and
unusual punishment claims or equal protection claims. Moreover, concerning Robinson’s
§ 1983 claims of constitutional violations, the District Court ruled that Robinson failed to
state a claim against the DOC, or against DOC Secretary Wetzel in his official capacity,
because states and state officials sued in official capacities are not “persons” capable of
being sued for civil rights violations under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that while state officials literally are persons,
“neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under
§ 1983”). The District Court also explained that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims
for damages against the DOC and Wetzel in his official capacity, see Melo v. Hafer,
912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990), and that Pennsylvania retains Eleventh Amendment

2

The District Court explained that Robinson did not allege race discrimination (§§ 1981
and 1982); interference with federal officials’ duties (§ 1985(1)); conspiracy to obstruct
justice and to intimidate litigants and witnesses (§ 1985(2)); or conspiracy motivated by
race- or class-based animus (§ 1985(3)). The District Court also noted that a § 1986
claim was dependent on a § 1985 violation.
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sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b).
Further, the District Court dismissed Robinson’s retaliation claim because Robinson’s
constitutionally-protected act of filing this lawsuit in April 2019 could not have been a
“motivating factor” for the earlier filing of false misconducts against Robinson in
December 2018. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).3 The District
Court’s dismissal of these claims was without leave to amend because amendment would
be futile. Robinson filed a notice of appeal, which was docketed at C.A. No. 19-2334.
On October 10, 2019, we dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, the District Court allowed Robinson’s remaining First Amendment
and Fourth Amendment claims for injunctive relief and punitive damages to proceed
against Wetzel and Smart Communications. The defendants filed motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Robinson filed responses
and a motion for sanctions against Smart Communications for failing to provide
discovery. On July 15, 2020, the District Court granted the motions to dismiss. The
District Court concluded that Robinson’s claim for injunctive relief concerning legal mail
had become moot,4 and that his Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim concerning
non-privileged mail was without merit. Finding that amendment of the claims would be

3

The District Court also noted that Robinson alleged no personal involvement by Wetzel
in issuing the misconducts.
4
In support of his motion to dismiss, defendant Wetzel cited Hayes, et al. v. Wetzel, et
al., M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-02100, in support of its statement that the policy for
handling privileged legal mail was changed because of litigation and settlement.
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futile, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. In addition, the District
Court denied Robinson’s motion for sanctions.
Robinson appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because
Robinson has been granted leave to proceed forma pauperis status under § 1915 on
appeal, we review the appeal for possible dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). We may
summarily affirm under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 if no substantial
question is presented.
Robinson’s notice of appeal specifies only the District Court’s July 15, 2020 order
granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). We may
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the prior order dismissing several of his claims under
§ 1915(e)(2), where his intent to appeal can be “fairly inferred” from his earlier appeal
that was dismissed. See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir.
2010). In any event, we would affirm the District Court’s § 1915(e)(2) dismissal order
for the reasons summarized above.
We turn to the District Court’s final order dismissing Robinson’s case. We
exercise plenary review over the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). We accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fleisher v.
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).
5

The District Court dismissed as moot Robinson’s claims for injunctive relief
regarding the treatment of privileged legal mail. We agree with that disposition. When
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court generally may consider only the
complaint’s allegations, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters of public record.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993). It readily appears that the DOC has changed its procedures for handling
privileged legal mail, and the prior policy requiring legal mail to be sent and processed by
Smart Communications is no longer in effect. See, e.g., Brock v Corr. Emergency
Response Team, No. 18-3814, 2020 WL668271, at *5 and n.5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2020)
(taking judicial notice of DOC policy regarding privileged mail as of April 6, 2019).
As for Robinson’s claim that the application of the DOC mail policy to nonprivileged mail amounts to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure violation, the District
Court correctly determined that Robinson’s claim is without merit. As an incarcerated
individual, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy to trigger Fourth Amendment
protections here. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 529-30 (1984) (holding that
a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell, which would include his
personal effects). Smart Communications asserted in support of its motion to dismiss that
it is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. Regardless, even if it were a state
actor, implementation of the mail policy does not amount to a Fourth Amendment
violation.
Finally, the District Court denied Robinson’s motion for sanctions against Smart
Communications, noting that discovery had been stayed pending the outcome of the
6

motions to dismiss. We review the District Court’s decision regarding imposition of
sanctions for discovery violations for abuse of discretion. See Grider v. Keystone Health
Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009). We discern no such abuse of
discretion here.
For the above reasons, we agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Robinson’s
complaint and its determination that amendment would be futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). We will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
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